RUssia - a counterbalancing agent to the Asia.
1.Asia
in the sphere of Europes economic interests
After involvement of East Asia in the sphere of Europes economic
interests, the last region of autonomous trend of development existed no longer.
Since that time the course of events in the region was determined by the major
European Powers interests rather than the logic of its own development. The
world market already actually formed and Great Britain exercised global control
over it.
Economic
development of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East by Russia after
defeat suffered in the Crimea Campaign was more or less successful attempts to
find a weak point in the overall Great Britains control over the markets.
Japans
position was far more difficult. After the USA seized the Japanese home market
by force, Japan struggled for East Asia, the only source of funds for its
economic development.
In
that historical situation, having developed the American continent the USA, as
well as Japan, had an opportunity for further economic growth only by means of
expanding their presence in East Asia.
In
the Pacific, as well as everywhere, Great Britain pursued the policy to
maintain its own predominance through mutual neutralization of the rivals.
The
extent of Russias presence in East Asia upset the then balance of power in the
region and grew into an imminent threat to the rivals.
Japan
most vigorously counteracted growing Russias influence in China and Korea as
this region was really of vital importance for it.
In
1902 Great Britain and Japan entered into a defensive and offensive alliance
directed immediately against Russia but mediately against the USA as well. That
showed the greatest promise for Japan. That is why it was extremely quick to
take advantage of the opportunity offered. After 1905, the growth of Russias
influence in the Far East was curbed. Whats more, the influence was
considerably contained in Japans favour
Under
the term of the Portsmouth peace treaty Russia had recognized Korea as Japans
sphere of influence, transferred a right to Liaotung Peninsula including Port
Arthur and well equipped port Dalny, the south part of Sakhalin Island and
assigned Japan the right to fishery in the Russian Far Eastern waters. In addition
to it, Japan got the south section of Chinese Eastern railroad of 715 km long
and a number of railroad and commercial subsidiaries as well as ship- and
steam-engine-repair plants in Dalny, coal mines in Shibeiline, Fushuni, etc.
Russia was found to be isolated from China along the most important Manchuria
line. The communication leading from the Russian-Chinese frontier to Yellow Sea
and to the North China through Mukden-Shanghaiguan were concentrated in Japans
hands, thus it was in a position to control trade between Russia and China
conducted through Manchuria.
But
Japans supremacy in South Manchuria was accompanied not only by rapid ousting
of Russian capital from all the spheres of economy. Great Britain and the USA
which were about to get their hands on the north-east part of China by using
Japan as a striking force were deeply disappointed. When the war began the USA
expected Japan to protect their interests in Manchuria as well as its own ones.
The USA completely took Japans side. As regards this point Franklin Roosevelt
said that it fought in our struggle in the Far East (Dulles F.R. Behind Open
Door, New York, 1944.p.48). When the USA declared their neutrality in the war,
rather auspicious for Japan, the American banks invested a major part of their
capital to finance the Japanese military operation.
In
Great Britains policy, Japan acted as a counterbalancing agent to Russia, to
advance its own interests Japan went farther ahead. The next impediment to
Japan was the USA, and contradictions between them began aggravating. It was
already Japans excessive strengthening that upset the balance of power.
Dynamic
equilibrium in the Asian Pacific region was a part of the global equilibrium
system. Qualitative changes of any kind in the region were feasible only
provided that the global correlation of forces between the major Powers
changed. In the long run they depended on Great Britain s ability to gain
global domination over Germany.
The
fact that Russia failed to settle its economic problems in Europe during the
Crimea campaign and was not in a position to enter actively the Far Eastern
market after 1905 eliminated any possibility for Russia to develop under a
free-market economy (division of the sphere of influence between Russia and
Great Britain in 1907 in Persia and Afghanistan didnt make up those
disadvantages). Whereas a role of Great Britains ally held out promises for
Russia to manage its economic problems in Europe and East. During World War I,
Russia acted as a counterbalancing agent to Germany in Great Britains global
policy.
The
war in Europe made it possible for Japan to expand its presence in East Asia at
the expense of Germany. Furthermore, taking advantage of the predicament Russia
was after 1917, Japan had seized some of the Russian territories. After seizure
of vast territories during that period Japan had overacted the role given. It
was just that fact which caused political reorientation of forces in the
region. The British Japanese alliance was dissolved. At the Washington
conference a group of Powers led by Great Britain emerged which was in direct
or indirect opposition to Japan. That thing initiated containing of Japans
presence in East Asia and rapprochement of the USA and Great Britain concerning
the East policy matters.
As
Soviet Russia came to appreciate the position and role of East Asia in its
national concerns, the relations with Japan began aggravating. For the most
part, Russias interests were concurrent with that of the USA and Great
Britain.
It
was in 1918 that Soviet Russia began reestablish its presence in China and to
pursue actively the policy of its own. And beginning from 1923 Russia rendered
aid to China. But the Comintern strict ideology neglected the overall
complexity of the political powers alignment in China and led to national unity
destruction. The Kuomintang party was compelled to break off relations with the
USSR and to join Japan. That had resulted in weakening not only the USSRs
position in China but also that of Great Britain.
Having
taken advantage of that situation, in 1931 Japan persistently set about
expanding its presence in China.
The
fact that the USSR international position had consolidated considerably was
rather unexpected for the Japanese and interested observers. Since 1935 due to
a number of diplomatic moves made in Europe the Soviet Union had fortified the
western borders and thus enabled to use part of resources for the Far East. In
the shortest time, fortifications, communications networks, airfields were
built there and armed forces reinforced. It was in 1937 that the Soviet-Chinese
treaty was concluded.
The
USSR directly participated in the military operations in China as well as the
arms deliveries. Among those facts were the 1938 Soviet border incident and the
1939 Mongolian border one. There are strong grounds to believe that an
initiator of these events could have been the Soviet Union supported by Great
Britain and the USA. Therefore it was already the USSR to act as a
counterbalancing agent to Japanese penetration into China. The Soviet Union
would have been unable to pursue actively its policy in the Far East (China)
and in Europe (Spain, Finland) if it hadnt served Great Britains and the
USAs interests. Otherwise, they had rather strong economic and political levers
to influence the Soviet Union.
Strengthening
of Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia made the USSR a key element of Great
Britains strategy in those regions. It was given a role of a counterbalancing
agent to Germany as well as to Japan. In the 1930s, rapprochement of Great
Britain, France and the USA with the USSR and extension of their cooperation
was brought about. In many respects that thing accounted for not only
simultaneous participation of the USSR in military operations in Spain,
Mongolia, and Manchuria but also the possibility itself of their implementation
under the then international situation and the state of the Soviet economy.
Tension
in Asia and Europe went on enhancing. Great Britain made an attempt to
implement stereotype political step. Russia was expected to neutralize Germany
and Japan in just the same way as it happened with Napoleonic France. The
policy of the so-called appeasement pursued in Europe and Asia just aimed at
clashing the USSR with Germany and Japan. For this reason the Soviet proposals
on the joint operations with Great Britain and France in the event of war with
Germany failed to arrive at a favorable reply, and it could not be otherwise.
The
paramount objective of Germanys foreign policy was to set up its world supremacy. To gain that goal Germany needed the USSR to
be neutralized. There were two ways to fulfil it: either to conclude a treaty
with Japan and to grip Russia in a vise or to sign a pact with the USSR.
In
contrast to Germanys end, Japans tasks to cope with were more particular and
regional. To clash with the USSR was not an end in itself for Japan as well.
The goal of Japans foreign policy was to develop Indo-China. As Japan expanded
its presence there, Great Britain and the USA through the USSR exerted more and
more pressure on it. To attain its aim it was also necessary for Japan to
neutralize the USSR. And it sought to arrange with Germany about entering into
a treaty under which security from the North was insured for Japan but it was
not obliged to get involved in the European events on the side of Germany. As
the first option was unacceptable for Japan, Germany had to take the second
option to neutralize the USSR, that was the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Berlin and
Moscow realized fully the policy of London and chose rather to come to an
agreement between each other. By having concluded a pact with Germany the USSR
cleared off a clash with it and gave Germany a free hand in relation to France
and Great Britain.
For
Japan it meant that it got isolated but the USSRs position in China had been
enhanced. And Japan came to appreciate clearly that its predominance was but
conjectural not only throughout East Asia but even in China. The way out of
that situation was the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and pact with Moscow. Hence the
threat from the North was eliminated but Japan was to define sharply its place
held in the pre-World War II alignment of the world forces. Quite apparently,
it pursued the aim of settlement of its own challenges rather than the allied ones.
By
having signed a pact with Japan, the USSR cleared off the clash in the Far East
as well. It was realized in Moscow that Russia would also have no place in a
new world order and that in the future it would fail to evade clash with
Germany and Japan. After occupation of France, Great Britain and USA were face
to face with Germany and Japan, thus the USSR obtained the allies and it became
inadmissible to expect Germany to gain a victory. There came a time for the
USSR to define its position in the world conflict. Evidently, Moscow had made a
choice.
Whereas
Germanys plan involved no conflict with the USSR. As far back as March 27,
1941, Germany didnt intend to attack the USSR. But having found out the Soviet
policy alteration and for unwillingness to expect the strike from the East,
Germany made a preventive strike. That was just the cause that accounted for
the lack of logic in Germanys invasion of Russia.
Since
October 1941, the Todzio Cabinet conducted active preparations for war. The
fact that the spheres of influence were divided between Japan and Germany, the
USSR was involved in a war (as well as
in the Soviet Japanese pact) made it possible for Japan to proceed to setting
up the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
After
the war the spheres of influence were divided between the USA and the USSR. But
the bipolar world structure was evident as far back as 1943. It was reasonable
for either side to extend the sphere of its influence. And the border between
them was to divide the vanquished countries. The thorough division in Europe
resulted in the status of Berlin. The situation was more favourable to Japan as
the border between the USSRs and the USAs spheres of influence could have
lain southward to partition Japan into the North and South ones (in a similar
way as Germany and Korea).
The
problem of the Northern Territories is that of the confrontation between the
USSR and the USA in general. Inasmuch as the West-East confrontation doesnt
exist any longer, taking into consideration todays situation in Europe where
transformation of the post-war state frontiers is in process we are of the
opinion that Japan has the sufficient reason not to recognize the post-war
status of the islands. Similar case, it will be recalled was the situation when
Russia was neutralized in the Black Sea in 1870 and then it violated its
obligations under the Paris peace treaty.
In
the course of war the allies faced the question as to the extent of the
military-political defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy. The decision was reached
to liquidate their military-industrial potential to exclude a possibility of
rebuilding it up.
Between
1945 and 1948 the vigorous campaign was being waged towards Japan to break up
military-industrial corporations into smaller units and to liquidate them, a
ban was imposed on the foreign trade. Re-orientation of the Japanese economy as
a whole was under way. The campaign of a similar nature was also launched
towards Germany.
But
the USSRs post-war position enabled it to adhere to an independent foreign
policy based on its own national interests. It goes without saying that it was
radically contradictory to the USAs interests. Implementation of the American
policy throughout the world was so much complicated by the post-war events in Eastern
Europe and China that in 1948 the USAs initial intentions in relation to
Germany and Japan had already been reversed.
The
post-war period saw another alteration in the balance of power in the world. As
confrontation between the USSR and the USA grew, a need was created for the USA
to form a new system of counterbalancing agents.
The USAs new policy towards Japan and Germany was already of a
mercantilist character. It was based on setting up the export-oriented branches
of the national economy and on providing them with the appropriate niches to
occupy in the world market controlled by the USA, it was just the thing that
accelerated the rate of the USA economic growth. It is pertinent to note that
Germanys and Japans post-war destiny was historically paradoxical, that is,
to lose a war meant for them to win it, to put it otherwise, they had gained
the aim they were striving for. In economic terms it has come to be known as
the German and Japanese economic miracle. By this expedient the anti-Soviet bloc
of countries was set up to oppose resolutely the Soviet foreign policy. As the
Soviet foreign policy was vitalized in Asia, the centers were coming into view
for the American counteraction to the USSRs influence they were later referred
to as newly industrialized countries. Their economies were developed in a
similar way. The same is true for European and Middle East countries. All of
those countries performed solely one function in the American policy, that of a
counterbalancing agent to the USSR. High economic growth rate of just those
states stemed from the fulfilment of the mission mentioned. Needless to say
that after demolition of the confrontation between the USSR and the USA they
will lose the functions performed in the USAs policy, therefore the favourable
economic conditions granted to them will go along with the functions.
Demolition of confrontation between the USSR and the USA will change the face
of the world beyond recognition in the foreseeable future.
2.Russia and Asia: the issues and
prospects
The economic development of the Soviet Far
Eastern territories depended on the growing requirements of the Soviet
extensive economy, which could mainly be supported by the home resources. It
was precisely that cause which induced to involve the raw material resources
located in the areas of extremely inhospitable nature and climate such as the
Far East in the national economic turnover.
The annual atmospheric temperature amplitude is
peak here; it is over 40 C. in the most part of the territory and even over 60
C. in number of areas.
Permafrost
occurs in 90% of the territory. The economic activities in the region is
considerably complicated by these adverse natural factors as well as high
seismicity. Construction and other operations are restricted in the territory;
these factors cause the exceeding costs for power, heating and heat insulation.
The suitable materials, equipment and processes adapted specially for the north
conditions are applied here.
The
rise in the cost entails the fact that the capital investment in the Far East
to produce the output comparable with that of the countrys central areas is
about 20% more and operating costs are 25% more.
Consequently,
it is apparent that solely the scarce goods and raw materials were produced
here, as their production was impossible in any other area of the country.
The
priority development of three industries was promoted in the Far East. There
are as follows non-ferrous metallurgy, fishery and timber industry. Diamonds
and almost all amount of gold were produced here. The territory held a leading
position in the country in production of tin, lead, zinc and other kinds of raw
materials. 40% of the Union fishery output and 8% of the Union timber and
woodworking output were produced in the Far East.
It
is clear that the overwhelming bulk of the output produced in Far East was
shipped to the European part of the country. Quota for non-ferrous output to be
shipped totaled 91%, that for fishery was 47% and so on. Whereas the materials
required for those industries were procured from other territories. 74% of
chemical and oil products, 86% of rolled metals and the most part of foodstuffs
consumed were procured to the Far East.
Under
the specific conditions of the USSRs closed extensive economy the Far East was
a major supplier of the non-ferrous raw materials, timber and fishery. The Far
Eastern enterprises production costs are far prohibitive than that of the
countrys similar ones, to say nothing of the foreign enterprises. As a case in
point, up to 1985 the Union direct and indirect subsidies granted only to the
Primorye Territory totaled 2 billion rubles per year in accordance with the
1984 prices.
To
set up the enterprises here was expedient in terms of economy only under the
USSRs former economic pattern that met its requirements mainly due to the home
resources (growing of north-kind cotton in Central Asia and tea in Georgia and
Krasnodar territory and so on). That is why the rigid economic policy was followed
by the government to develop mining industries and to restrict manufacturing
ones. It is self-evident that the course was worth-while as that policy served
to evade investment (prohibitive beyond belief) getting scattered and to use
comprehensively the tight manpower resources of the Far East. The arguments
above substantiate the view that the Far East is not the right region in world
to attract foreign investment. There are a lot of regions throughout the world
to exploit the same resources rather profitably and, what is more, without any
subventions. To be of the opinion that not only manufacturing but also mining
industries will be developed by the foreign entrepreneurs is the height of
economic absurdity. This point was fully comprehended even by the authors of
the Soviet national economic plan on location and development of manufacturing
industries. It was only of necessity that the enterprises to mine the scarce
raw materials were located here and infrastructure was under development. A
foreign entrepreneur has nothing to do in the Far East; the same will also be
true of Russia itself if it enters the world market.
Let
us appraise the prospects for the Russian Far East not only in the light of
economic concerns. Recall the post-war situation when a bloc of states was
being formed to act as a military strategic counterbalancing agent to the
USSR. Was Germany war-ravaged and partitioned of any slightest economic
interest for the USA? (To say nothing of Japan and Taiwan as their economic
potential was not to be compared with German one, namely, the Japanese industry
was completely destroyed during the war, Taiwan had no industry at all, the raw
materials base was unavailable in those states and beyond those points to take
into consideration a great distance away from market outlets.)
Obviously,
it was not the USAs economic concern that launched the overall cooperation
with them. The German and Japanese economic miracles, the amazing economic
growth rate of Taiwan and other newly industrialized countries arose from
their military-strategic position in the American system of the
counterbalancing agents. It was only after formation of the Peoples Republic
of China and beginning of the Korean War (1950) when USA in addition to the
gratuitous aid of 2 billion dollars started placing their military orders in
Japan that investment flowed to give an impetus to economic growth and the
pre-war level of industrial production was restored next year. When the Korean
War ended and investment flow was reduced (1953), Japan went into an economic
recession.
Under
conditions of the global economic crisis, the contradictions between the major
industrial states will aggravate, on the one hand, and on the other hand,
formation of the states with centralized economy will be in process.
The
situation in the Asian Pacific region will be rather intricate and drastically
changeable. As the confrontation between the USSR and the USA ceased, a number
of Asian countries has lost their military-strategic functions they performed
to contain the Soviet influence in the region. These countries are Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan and other ones. Because of the global crisis and cessation of the
confrontation between the USSR and the USA they will be deprived of the
favourable conditions for trade with the USA and Western Europe and
consequently the high rate of their economic growth will slow down. Making
attempts to settle their economic issues by means of expanding their presence
in Asia these countries will inevitably collide with the vital interests of the
USA and Western Europe.
Since
Japans interests on the world market will be infringed on by the USA and
Western Europe, it will try to center the region states economies on the
Japanese economy. (Such was the case with Germany and Eastern Europe prior to
World War II.) In our view it will
surely lead to setting up a military bloc of these states to protect their
common interests. The East Asia countries conglomerate associated economically
and pursuing the common aims will exert the great impact not only on the Asia
Pacific region but also on the world as a whole. We are of the opinion that
economic cooperation between Japan and the newly industrialized countries, on
the one hand, and China and other East Asian countries, on the other hand, will
be expanded.
After
a lost decade of the independent attempts to stabilize the national economy,
China was drawn into an orbit of the American policy towards the USSR and since
late 1970s the favourable conditions for its economic advance were created by
the USA. The Western aid to China was increased especially during the Soviet
armed forces presence in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese ones in Cambodia. Now
that the Soviet presence in these countries, as well as in the region, is no
longer, further assistance to Chinas economy makes no sense. It is worth
nothing that for China it implies that the newly-emerged faint traits of the
free-market economy will vanish.
In
the overall alignment of world forces and in the Asian Pacific region in
particular, China will take the place of the former USSR and play its role. It
will oppose both the USAs interests, on one hand, and that of Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, on the other hand.
To
summarize our speculation about the Asian Pacific region prospects as well as
probable future alignment of forces in the region we emphasize that after
disintegration of USSR, the West-East confrontation will be replaced by the
North-South confrontation and Russia will fulfil the function of
counterbalancing agent in Asia and Middle East. In the nearest future the
situation in Asian Pacific region will be defined as the growing confrontation
between two powerful groupings. A mighty bloc of Asian and most likely the
Middle East countries will oppose the USA and Western Europe, Japan being a
coordinating center of the bloc. Already today Japan is the second
industrialized country in the world.
Russia
will inevitably act as a counterbalancing agent to the Asian countries bloc in
the policy of the USA and Western Europe towards the Asian Pacific region, the
Middle East, the Balkan countries and Eastern Europe. Russians position is
strategically beneficial both in Asia and Europe; it has abundant raw material
resources and used to play a like role.
In
our view, as the confrontation stated above will strengthen, Russia will have
the economic miracle similar German, Japanese, Korean etc. when these
countries executed function of a counterbalancing agent to the USSR.
It
is evident from the above that the Russian Far East will not have pure economic
attraction as well as post-war Germany and Japan. Under new overall alignment
of world forces, it will become a region of strategic significance to implement
the policy of the North in Asia. All the more so, as there are excellent
opportunities to initiate the military-strategic cooperation, that is, rather
powerful military-strategic complex and Pacific Fleet bases.
Ph.D. Alexander Kuliabin
Ph.D. Sergey Semin
Zavtra Rossii, #28, 17 July 1997.
